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ACUS-And Administrative LawThen and Now
Michael Herz*
ABSTRACT

The Administrative Conference of the United States ("ACUS") both
shapes and reflects the intellectual, policy, and practical concerns of the field
of administrative law. Its recommendations are therefore a useful lens
through which to view that field. Also, because of an unfortunate hiatus,
ACUS has gotten underway not once but twice. Those two beginnings provide a kind of natural experiment, and they make a revealing contrast. This
article traces the transformations of American administrative law, as well as
the field's perpetual concerns, by comparing the initial recommendations of
ACUS 1.0 (1968 to 1970) with the initial recommendations of ACUS 2.0 (2010
· to 2013). ACUS issued its first recommendations in 1968. At the time, Richard Stewart's celebrated article, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, was still seven years away, and the rise of the interest representation
model Professor Stewart identified was underway but not complete. Since
then, administrative law has continued to be reformed, moving away from the
interest representation model. Certain issues-for example, transparency, efficiency, and meaningful public participation-remain central preoccupations.
However, new technologies, a shift from adjudication to rulemaking, the influence of the unitary executive model, and other developments, all woven into
the more recent recommendations, make the contemporary field quite different from your grandfather's administrative law.
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INTRODUCTION
In Gilbert and Sullivan's The Pirates of Penzance, or the Slave of
Duty, 1 our hero, Frederic, is apprenticed to a band of pirates until he
turns twenty-one. Just as he is about to reach the keenly anticipated
end of his apprenticeship, it is revealed that he was born on February
29th in a leap year. Under the articles of apprenticeship, he is indentured until his twenty-first birthday, not his twenty-first year. Accordingly, he is only a quarter of the way through. Hilarity ensues.
This celebration of the Administrative Conference's fiftieth anniversary confronts the inverse problem. Whereas Frederic had seen
twenty-one years but far fewer than twenty-one birthdays, ACVS has
seen fifty birthdays but not fifty years. It was "born" in August 1964,
when President Johnson signed the Administrative Conference Act. 2
But there have been a few gaps-if ACUS were a job applicant, it
would have a lot of explaining to do about the holes in its resume.
First, it took four years to get up and running.3 Then, as everyone in
1 1 W .S. Gilbert, The Pirates of Penzance, or the Slave of Duty, in THE ANNOTATED Gu-BERT AND SuLLIVAN 83 (Ian Bradley ed., 1982).
2 Administrative Conference Act, Pub. L. No. 88-499, 78 Stat. 615 (1964) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 591-96 (2012)).
3 President Johnson nominated Jerre Williams as the first Chairman of ACUS on October
14, 1%7. ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., 1969 ANNUAL REPORT: ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 4 (1970). Williams was confirmed five days later; he actually got to
work on January 8, 1968; the first plenary session was in May 1968. Id. at 4, 26. The then-head
of the Office of Legal Counsel, Frank Wozencraft, points to three reasons for the delay. First,
standing up the new agency was "nobody's priority," and everyone was just very busy. Tran script: Forty-Second Session of the Administrative Conference of the United States, 53 U. PITT. L.
REv. 857, 864 (1992) (remarks of Frank Wozencraft). Second, "it was a strange animal, a her-
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the administrative law world knows only too well, it was defunded in
the mid-1990s, only reemerging in 2010.
Thus, there is a nice jurisprudential question as to whether this
fiftieth anniversary celebration is quite kosher. However, if rigid literalism was good enough for the Pirate King and the wretched Frederic,
it is good enough for me. So, fifty Augusts having come and gone
since ACUS was created, I am delighted to be participating in this
tribute to ACUS on the occasion of its fiftieth anniversary (give or
take).
Indeed, I would like to take advantage of ACUS's awkward fourteen-and-a-half year dormant period to structure my contribution to
this special issue. The hibernation resulted in, as they are usually referred to, "ACUS 1.0" and "ACUS 2.0." 4 ACUS got underway not
once but twice; not once but twice it surveyed the field of administrative law looking for important topics-areas of solvable inefficiency or
unfairness, to use the terms that recur in its statute. 5 But those two
beginnings were far apart in time-ten February 29ths had come and
gone between them. The world was a rather different place in 2010
than it had been in 1968. Accordingly, reviewing the recommendations from ACUS's first three years-or, to be precise, from ACUS's
first first three years-and comparing them with those from ACUS's
second first three years will reveal something about how the world of
administrative law has, and has not, changed.

maphrodite combination of Government and public members . . . . Until the Conference existed,
it was very hard to imagine what it would be like, what it would actually do. Its mission blended
the academic approach with the practical problems of Government. That's what makes ACUS
so valuable, but it made it hard to sell." Id. And, finally, "it was unbelievably difficult to find
the first chairman." Id.
4 I believe it was Jeffrey Lubbers who first used these terms. See Jeffrey S. Lubbers,
ACUS 2.0 and Its Historical Antecedents, AoMIN. & REo . L. NEws, Spring 2011 , at 9.
5 The original Administrative Conference Act expressed Congress's desire to ensure
"maximum effidency and fairness" in the administrative process, Administrative Conference
Act§ 2(b), noted agency heads' responsibility to "assur[e) fair and efficient administrative procedure," id. § 2(c), articulated the desire that "private rights may be fully protected and . . .
Federal responsibilities may be carried out expeditiously," id. § 2(e), and charged ACUS with
studying "the efficiency, adequacy, and fairness of the administrative procedure used by administrative agencies," id. § 5(a). ACUS 2.0 operates under a slightly different and broader set of
legislative purposes, see 5 U.S.C. § 591, but the key provision regarding "powers and duties"
remains unchanged. In particular, each incarnation was given the authority to "study the efficiency, adequacy, and fairness of the administrative procedure used by administrative agencies in
carrying out administrative programs, and make recommendations." Administrative Conference
Act § 5(a); 5 U.S.C. § 594(1).
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THE AGES OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

Before turning to the recommendations themselves, it is worth
getting a sense of the lay of the land. ACUS has not operated in a
vacuum; it has been both a shaper, and a product, of the political,
judicial, and academic preoccupations that characterized its different
eras. Thus, it makes sense to begin with a review of the overall settings in which it has operated.
The central conceptual project of administrative law is to legitimate and cabin agencies' exercise of discretion. Scholars have laid out
a generally accepted historical account of the shifting approaches to
this challenge. 6 A century ago, agency exercises of discretionary authority were justified under the so-called "transmission belt" theory,
under which agencies truly were agents and Congress remained the
principal.7 On this account, agencies had little discretion; they merely
found facts and implemented the legislature's policy prescriptions in
light thereof. 8 The traditional model emphasized the necessity of legislative authorization of, and constraints on, agency discretion, as well
as reliance on procedures designed to ensure compliance with legislative directives and the availability of judicial review to do the same. 9
The traditional model began to crack with the New Deal, when it
became inescapably clear that the assumptions on which it was based
were simply inaccurate. Agencies were exercising significant discretion, barely constrained by legislative directive. 10 A different theory
of legitimacy was needed, and it was found in the principle of agency
expertise. On this understanding, agencies face decisions that are essentially technocratic and have right and wrong answers; because
agencies base their decisions on expertise, concerns about whim, pref6 See, e.g., STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 17-29 (7th ed. 2011); Mark Seidenfeld, The Role of Politics in a Deliberative Model of the
Administrative State, 81 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1397, 1403-16 (2013); Sidney Shapiro et al., The
Enlightenment of Administrative Law: Looking Inside the Agency for Legitimacy, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 463, 471-76 (2012); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1671-76 (1975) .
7 See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 6, at 1675.
8 See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107
CoLUM. L. REv. 1749, 1758 (2007).
9 See id. ("By confining agencies to legislative directives, administrative procedures, as
enforced by the Court, served to promote fairness and rationality.").
10 Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 461, 471 (2003) (noting that the transmission belt theory
"simply did not describe the government we had after about 1930"); Stewart, supra note 6, at
1677 (" [A]fter the delegation by New Deal Congresses of sweeping powers . . . the broad and
novel character of agency discretion could no longer be concealed behind such labels.").
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erence, clashing values, or ideology can be set aside. As Richard
Stewart has put it, on this model "persons subject to the administrator's control are no more liable to his arbitrary will than are patients
remitted to the care of a skilled doctor. " 11
The expertise model, too, suffered from exposure to the real
world. Already, during the debates over the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 12 adopted in 1946, expansive agency discretion had
many critics. The APA can be seen as a compromise, accepting
agency policymaking and enforcement discretion while seeking to
avoid its abuse through the twin tools of procedural protections and
judicial review.13 That compromise held for the next two decades, as
the traditional understandings matured but were not abandoned. 14
The mid-1960s, however, saw another shift, and it was a fundamental one. As "[p]ublic trust in regulation and the administrative
process began to disintegrate," courts became more aggressive in reviewing the substance of agency decisions and in requiring expansive
procedures. 15 This was also a period of intense concern that agencies
had been captured by the very interests they were supposed to be regulating.16 The cure for capture was seen as full participation by all
affected interests. 17 So, just as the transmission belt model had
yielded to the expertise model, now the expertise model yielded to an
"interest representation" model. 18 On this account, the administrative
process was legitimate because, and only to the extent that, it replicated the pluralist legislative process; therefore all interests had to be
able to participate fully and effectively. In particular, agencies and the
courts had to open their doors to regulatory beneficiaries.
The interest representation model yielded in turn, about fifteen
years later, to a focus on presidential control. Sidney Shapiro calls
this the "counter-reformation." 19 The roots of modern presidentialism
can be found in the Nixon Administration's Quality of Life Review,
Stewart, supra note 6, at 1678.
Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.) .
13 BREYE R ET AL , supra note 6, at 22.
14 Id. at 23.
1s Id. at 24.
16 Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967- /983, 72 Ctt1.-KENT L. REv.
1039, 1050 (1997).
17 See, e.g., Simon Lazarus & Joseph Onek, The Regulators and the People, 57 VA. L. REv .
1069, 1074-76, 1092-106 (1971).
18 See Stewart, supra note 6, at 1722-30.
19 Sidney A. Shapiro, Administrative Law After the Counter-Reformation: Restoring Faith
in Pragmatic Government, 48 U. KAN. L. R EV. 689, 697, 707-08 (2000).
11

12
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but it was the arrival of Ronald Reagan in the White House in 1981
that marked the real beginning of the era of "presidential administration. " 20 This model highlights the president's unique position as the
one government official who is nationally elected. The theory emphasizes the unitary executive, centralized regulatory review, and legitimation through presidential control. 21
Have we left this era of presidential control? Not really; presidential administration is as robust as ever. 22 But it is possible that the
model may be changing in important ways yet again:
Unlike past transformations, the most important current developments are not legal in nature; they are technological.
Administrative law now both relies on and is shaped by the
Internet and associated technologies. . . . [A]gency Web
sites, use of social media, "e-rulemaking," wide dissemination of government information via the Internet-these have
transformed the day-to-day operations of agencies. . . .
Many see technological innovation as promising to fundamentally transform the nature of administration and the relationship between agency and citizen, enabling a new era of
democratic participation, cooperation, and informed agency
decisionmaking. 23
Accepting at least the rough outlines of this thumbnail sketch,
ACUS straddles three periods. It got under way just at the moment
that the "reformation" was starting to take hold; it was in operation,
and then on unpaid leave, as the presidential model became ascendant; and it returned to business as agencies were rapidly deploying
new technologies. In particular, ACUS's two beginning periods occurred just as new conceptualizations of the administrative process
were-or may now be-taking hold. Accordingly, ACUS's work
product should reflect these shifts, or at least display different emphases in different eras. On the other hand, the agency has operated
under the same statutory mandate and with the same basic structure
20 See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARv. L. REv. 2245, 2276-80 (2001)
(observing that President Reagan laid the foundation for an administrative state that functioned
as an extension of the president's policy agenda); see also Bressman, supra note 10, at 487. President Reagan 's most important initiative was Executive Order 12,291, which established the modern version of centralized review of proposed regulations by the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127-34 (1982).

21

See Bressman, supra note 10, at 485-87; Kagan, supra note 20, at 2331-32.

See, e.g., Nina A . Mendelson & Jonathan B. Wiener, Responding to Agency Avoidance
of O/RA, 37 HARV. J.L. & Pua. PoL'Y 447, 454-63 (2014).
22

23

BREYER ET AL., supra note 6, at 29.

ACUS-AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-THEN AND NOW

2015]

1223

throughout, which should bring a certain consistency of theme and
approach.
II.

IN THE BEGINNING

Between 1968 and 1970, the Administrative Conference produced twenty-two recommendations, which will be the focus of this
review. These seem enough to be a representative sample, while still
reflecting a particular moment in time. Three years is a pretty long
"moment," to be sure, but in the grand scheme of things, it is quite
brief. It provides a snapshot, not a movie. Or, if a movie, then My
Dinner with Andre,24 not Boyhood. 25 These recommendations also
make a tidy, self-contained corpus because they were all published
together in the first volume of ACUS's Recommendations and Reports.26 The review for ACUS 2.0 will cover the same length of time;
this second set of recommendations numbers twenty-five, produced
from the end of 2010 through 2013. 27
A.

Four Major Themes

What seem to have been the major issues confronting the wise
men of administrative law28 in 1968? Various characterizations of the
first twenty-two recommendations are possible, but the following
themes dominate: transparency, reducing delay and inefficiency, enhancing public participation in agency proceedings, and increasing the
availability of judicial review.
MY DINNER WITH ANDRE (Saga Prods., Inc. 1981).
25 BOYHOOD (IFC Prods. 2014).
26 1 ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U .S., RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (1968-1970) [hereinafter RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS].
27 The twenty-two recommendations from the first three years of ACUS 1.0, numbers 68-1
through 70-5, are summarized in Appendix A , infra. The twenty-five recommendations produced during the first three years of ACUS 2.0, numbers 2010-1 through 2013-7 (plus Statement
18), are summarized in Appendix B, infra.
28 And they were indeed (almost) all men. As of 1970, the Chairman was male, the tenmember Council was all male, and the eighty-six then present and former members of the Conference included a grand total of three women: Carolyn Agger, Patricia Harris, and Charlotte
Tuttle Lloyd. See REc oMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS, supra note 26, at ii, 3-6. By contrast, as of
this writing, four of the nine Council members are female, see Council Roster, AoMIN. CoNF.
U.S., http://www.acus.gov/directory/council (last visited Sept. 5, 2015), as are thirty-seven of the
eighty-two members of the Assembly, see Government Members Roster, ADMIN. CoNF. U.S.,
http://www.acus.gov/directory/government-member (last visited Sept. 5, 2015); Public Members
Roster, ADMIN. CoNF. U.S., http://www.acus.gov/directory/public-member (last visited Sept. 5,
2015). So one highly notable change between ACUS 1.0 and 2.0 is in the gender (im)balance
within the Conference (and the field , and the profession, generally).
24
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Transparency

Though the term is anachronistic and cannot be found in the
early reports or recommendations, what we would now call transparency was a fundamental concern in the early recommendations.
Indeed, it is central to a significant plurality of these recommendations. For example:
• Recommendation 68-2 pointed out that the U.S. Government
Manual, the official handbook of the federal government, contained descriptions of agencies that were often "outdated, unrevealing, cumbersome, or otherwise deficient. " 29 It urged all
agencies to review and rewrite their entries, and, in particular,
to include therein instructions as to how to obtain additional
information. 30
• Recommendation 68-3 31 offered a similar lament about the
Parallel Table of Statutory Authorities and Rules. 32 This is a
two-column list of all statutory provisions on which agencies
relied in issuing regulations, together with the Code of Federal
Regulations citations for those regulations. 33 The recommendation reported that the Table was highly inaccurate and incomplete and urged agencies to submit cleaned-up versions to
the Office of the Federal Register. 34
• Recommendation 68-4 urged publication of a "Consumer Bulletin," circulated to "the press, consumer organizations, public
and scholastic libraries, and individuals who request to be put
on the mailing list," which would describe recent federal
agency actions of interest and significance to consumers. 35
• Recommendation 69-3, Publication of a "Guide to Federal Reporting Requirements," recommended publishing a listing of
29 ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATION 68-2, U.S. GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION MANUAL 1 (1968), https://www.acus.gov/recommendation/us-government-organization-manual.

30

Id.

ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATION 68-3, PARALLEL TABLE OF
STATUTORY AuTHORITIES AND RuLES (2 CFR CH. I) 1 (1968), https://www.acus.gov/recommendation/parallel-table-statutory-authorities-and-rules-2-cfr-ch-i.
31

32 See Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules, C.F.R. INDEX 833 (2014), http://www.gpo
.gov/help/parallel_table.pdf.
33

Id.

34 RECOMMENDATION 68-3, supra note 31, at 12.
35 ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATION 68-4, CONSUMER BULLETIN 1
(1968) , http://www.acus.gov/recommendation/consumer-bulletin.
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agency reporting requirements and their statutory or regulatory bases. 36
• Recommendation 69-4 urged agencies to determine whether
analytic subject indexes for their Code of Federal Regulations
("CFR") volumes would be appropriate and, if so, to produce
such indexes.37
• Recommendation 69-6 called on agencies to compile statistics
regarding all their proceedings-rulemaking and adjudication,
formal and informal-indicating how many of each were initiated, concluded, and pending each year. 38
• Recommendation 70-2 was a set of proposals regarding the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") no-action
letter process "intended to enable the public and individual
stockholders to be more fully advised of the interpretations,
policies and precedents which guide the conclusions of the
Commission and the staff. " 39
Finally, Recommendation 70-5 concerned the processes of the
now-defunct Renegotiation Board, which was authorized to eliminate
"excessive profits" earned by any government contractor receiving
more than $1 million a year. 40 The recommendation called on the
Board to make public the apparently mysterious factors on which it
relied in determining whether profits were "excessive." 41
In reading these recommendations, it is striking how strongly the
Conference seemed to feel that the general public, regulated entities,
and even sophisticated players were operating in the dark. Government operations appear to have been extraordinarily opaque. In part,
36 ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATION 69-3, PUBLICATION OF A
"GUIDE TO FEDERAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS" 1 (1969), https://www.acus.gov/recommendation/publication-guide-federal-reporting-requirements.
37 ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATION 69-4, ANALYTICAL SUBJECTINDEXES TO SELECTED VOLUMES OF THE CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS 1 (1969), https://
www.acus.gov/recommendation/analytical-subject-indexes-selected-volumes-code-federalregulations.
38 ACUS Recommendation 69-6, Compilation of Statistics on Administrative Proceedings
by Federal Departments and Agencies, 1 C.F.R. § 305.69-6 (1993).
39 ADMIN. CoNFERENCE oF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATION 70-2, SEC No-ACTION LETTERS
UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933, at 1(1970) https://www.acus.gov/recommendation/sec-no-action-letters-under-section-4-securi ties-act-1933.
40 STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 93D CONG., SUMMARY OF
RENEGOTIATION ACT OF 1951 AND RENEGOTIATION BOARD PROPOSAL FOR EXTENSION
(Comm. Print 1973).
41 ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U .S., RECOMMENDATION 70-5, PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES UNDER THE RENEGOTIATION ACT OF 1951, at 1 (1970) http://www.acus.gov/recommendation/practices-and-procedures-under-renegotiation-act-1951.
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the problems were of the most fundamental sort; they involved the
inability to find law. Beyond that, ACUS was concerned with the unavailability of basic information about agency operations. All of these
recommendations aim at avoiding secret law, making requirements
and decisionmaking criteria easier to find, and providing information
about how agencies actually operate.

2.

Delay and Inefficiency

In December 1960, former Harvard Law School Dean James Landis submitted a report to President-elect Kennedy regarding regulatory agencies. 42 The report reviewed various problems bedeviling
federal agencies and offered suggestions for fixing them (one of
which, importantly, was creation of an administrative conference). 43
In his account of problems to be solved, Landis gave delay pride of
place, observing that "[i]nordinate delay characterizes the disposition
of adjudicatory proceedings before substantially all of our regulatory
agencies." 44 Not surprisingly, ACUS's early years reveal a near-obsession with delay.
Many of the early recommendations flagged the problem of delay
and offered some remedies. The two most significant of these were
major proposals, both since widely adopted, for speeding up formal
adjudications. First, Recommendation 68-6 urged greater delegation
of final decisional authority to intermediate appellate boards within
agencies, stressing that not every final decision had to be made by the
agency itself.45 In the underlying report, James Freedman, drawing on
Landis, identified delay as one of the "two fundamental problems that
threaten and often compromise the effectiveness of the administrative
process." 46 Second, Recommendation 70-3 endorsed agency summary
42

CHAIRMAN OF THE SUBCOMM. ON ADMIN. PRACTICE

ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG. ,

&

PROCEDURE OF THE S. COMM.

REP. ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT

(Comm. Print 1960) (report of James McCauley Landis) [hereinafter Landis).
43 Id. at 74 ("The concept of an Administrative Conference of the United States promises
more to the improvement of administrative procedures and practices and to the systematization
of the federal regulatory agencies than anything presently on the horizon."). Prompted by the
Landis Report, among other things, President Kennedy established a temporary Administrative
Conference by executive order in April 1961. Exec. Order No. 10,934, 26 Fed. Reg. 3233 (Apr.
15, 1961). But I do not want to dwell on this early iteration, let alone its 1953-1955 predecessor,
see Lubbers, supra note 4, at 9 nn.6-10, for fear that someone might suggest we have already
missed the Conference's fiftieth anniversary.
44 Landis, supra note 42, at 5.
45 ACUS Recommendation 68-6, Delegation of Final Decisional Authority Subject to Discretionary Review by the Agency, 1 C.F.R. § 305.68-6 (1993).
46 James 0. Freedman, Report of the Committee on Agency Organization and Procedure in
Support of Intermediate Appellate Boards: Subparagraph 1 (a) of Recommendation No. 6, in REc-
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judgment procedures to avoid unnecessary hearings. 47 The underlying
report, by Ernest Gellhorn, began thus: "Delay is widely acknowledged as a major inadequacy of the administrative process. " 48
Other more focused recommendations aimed at problems of delay included:
• Recommendation 69-2 urged that National Labor Relations
Board ("NLRB") orders be made automatically judicially enforceable ( as are those of most other independent agencies) so
that the Board would no longer need to seek affirmative judicial confirmation of its orders.49 The recommendation noted
that "[t]he present practice burdens the courts with unnecessary proceedings whose only product is delay rather than added
protection against ill-founded action." 50
• Recommendation 69-6 proposed compilation of comprehensive
statistics regarding agency actions. 51 Much of the motivation
for the recommendation was concern about delay and the need
to get a handle on the scope of the problem. 52
OMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS, supra note 26, at 125, 125. The second fundamental problem
was "failure to achieve coherent policy formulation." Id. In the ensuing years, both problems
came to be seen as having the same solution, at least in part: a shift from adjudication to
rulemaking as the primary mechanism for policymaking. See infra note 104 and accompanying
text. But that shift was not yet perceived in 1968-at least, such a perception is not evident in
the Conference's work product.
47 ACUS Recommendation 70-3, Summary Decision in Agency Adjudication, 1 C.F.R.
305.70-3 (1993).
48 Ernest Gellhorn, Report of the Committee on Agency Organization and Procedure in
Support of Recommendation No. 20, in RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS, supra note 26, at
545, 545.

§

49 ACUS Recommendation 69-2, Judicial Enforcement of Orders of the National Labor
Relations Board, 1 C.F.R. § 305.69-2 (1993).
50 Id.; see also Admin. Conference of the U.S., Report of the Committee on Judicial Review
in Support of Recommendation No. IO, in RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS, supra note 26, at
238, 238 ("[Precluding the NLRB from issuing automatically enforceable orders] serves no useful purpose but operates to delay the effectiveness of NLRB orders and to impose unnecessary
costs on the Board."). This recommendation resurrected a recommendation of the 1961-1962
Administrative Conference; the report accompanying that recommendation is replete with references to the delays caused by the existing procedure. See id. at 244, 249-51 , 254-58.
51 ACUS Recommendation 69-6, Compilation of Statistics on Administrative Proceedings
by Federal Departments and Agencies, 1 C.F.R. § 305.69-6 (1993).
52 See Staff of the Office of the Chairman, Report of the Committee on Licenses and Authorizations in Support of Recommendation No. 14, in RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS, supra
note 26, at 287, 288 ("In particular, the problem of inordinate delays in the administrative process demands statistical study."); see also id. at 289 ("The Committee is of the view that time has
run out for casual efforts to combat inordinate delays in agency proceedings. The Committee
believes that an intensive and concerted attack upon this persistent problem is long overdue.").
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• Recommendation 69-5 urged elimination of duplicative hearings in Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") safety decertification cases. 53
Finally, concerns about delay were also an aspect of the recommendations and reports concerning selection and qualifications of
hearing examiners (Recommendation 69-9) 54 and discovery (Recommendation 70-4). 55

3.

Enhancing Public Participation in Agency Proceedings

A third theme that runs through multiple recommendations is the
principle that it should be easier for private entities, especially those
lacking wealth and legal representation, to participate effectively in
agency proceedings. These recommendations are, of course, the
purest expressions of the "interest representation" model that was
taking hold as ACUS began operation. 56 Many of the recommendations having to do with transparency are examples; their implicit premise was that the reason it should be easier to access the law and learn
about agency operations was that as things stood no one but the most
sophisticated insiders could do so. 57 These concerns also underlie two
of the boldest early recommendations.
The first of these is Recommendation 68-5, Representation of the
Poor in Agency Rulemaking of Direct Consequence to Them. 58 It
urged federal agencies to undertake affirmative efforts and outreach
to ensure input from poor people with regard to rulemakings that
might have a substantial effect on the poor. 59 These efforts could include holding hearings in convenient locations, directly soliciting submissions from representatives of the poor, conducting field surveys of
53 ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U .S., RECOMMENDATION 69-5, ELIMINATION OF DUPLICATIVE HEARINGS IN FAA SAFETY DE-CERTIFICATION CASES 1 (1%9), https://www.acus.gov/
recommendation/elimination-duplicative-hearings-faa-safety-de-certification-cases.
54 ACUS Recommendation 69-9, Recruitment and Selection of Hearing Examiners; Continuing Training for Government Attorneys and Hearing Examiners; Creation of a Center for
Continuing Legal Education in Government, 1 C.F.R. § 305.69-9 (1988); see Robert E. Park,
Report of the Committee on Personnel in Support of Recommendation No. 17, in RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS, supra note 26, at 381, 393, 397.
55 See ACUS Recommendation 70-4: Discovery in Agency Adjudication, 1 C.F.R.
§ 305.70-4 (1988); Edward A. Tomlinson, Report of the Committee on Compliance and Enforcement Proceedings in Support of Recommendation No. 21, in RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS,
supra note 26, at 577, 578-79, 591, 600-07, 628, 635, 644.
56 See supra text accompanying notes 18-19.
57 See supra Part II.Al.
58 ACUS Recommendation 68-5, Representation of the Poor in Agency Rulemaking of
Direct Consequence to Them, 1 C.F.R. § 305.68-5 (1993).
59 Id. at 57-58.
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poor people, and setting up advisory committees consisting of representatives of poor people. 60 When necessary, agencies should directly
reimburse individuals for expenses or lost wages resulting from participating in a rulemaking. 61 In its most controversial provision, the recommendation called on Congress to establish and fund a quasigovernmental "People's Counsel," the staff of which would "represent
the interests of the poor in all Federal administrative rulemaking substantially affecting the poor." 62 To modern ears-at least, to this author's modern ears-the calls for financial support and creation of a
People's Counsel are among the most anachronistic of the early recommendations, reflecting a distant, unrecoverable past.
The People's Counsel idea, with its slightly communist
resonances, never really caught hold. Funding to support private participation in agency proceedings did enjoy some modest success in the
1970s. Congress authorized certain agencies to provide such payments, and as many as fourteen agencies adopted some sort of program to compensate for the costs of participation. 63 But these efforts
fell by the wayside with the arrival of the Reagan administration and
have never been resurrected. 64 In 1971, ACUS itself backed away a
little from the idea. In a recommendation directly addressed to enhancing public participation in rulemaking, it considered but rejected
a proposal from the Committee on Agency Organization and Procedure to recommend that agencies actually fund citizen participation. 65
The other relatively bold proposal aimed at enhanced public participation was Recommendation 69-8,66 which advocated eliminating
Id.
61 Id. at 58.

60

62 Id. at 58-59. This was the only of the first twenty-two recommendations to elicit dissenting statements from members of the Conference who disagreed. Six separate statements
were filed. Most of these objected to the People's Counsel proposal. See RECOMMENDATIONS
AND REPORTS, supra note 26, at 16-20.
63 For a general overview, see Carl Tobias, Great Expectations and Mismatched Compensa-

tion: Government Sponsored Public Participation in Proceedings of the Consumer Product Safety
Commission, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 1101, 1101-09 (1986).
64 See id. at 1108-09.
65 See id. at 1104; see also Ernest Gellhorn, Public Participation in Administrative Proceedings, in 2 ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S. , RECOMMENDATIONS AND R EPORTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES at 376, 401 , 406 (1970-1972). Then-ACUS
Chairman Roger Cramton, on the other hand, was open to the idea. See Roger C. Cramton, The
Why, Where and How of Broadened Public Participation in the Administrative Process, 60 GEo.
L.J. 525, 541-46 (1972) (reviewing different possible mechanisms for payment of attorneys' fees
for members of the public participating in agency proceedings).
66 ACUS Recommendation 69-8, Elimination of Certain Exemptions from the AP A
Rulemaking Requirements, 1 C.F.R. § 305.69-8 (1993).
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the exemption from the APA's rulemaking requirements for rules regarding "public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts" 67 and
urged agencies to go through the notice-and-comment process for
such rules even when not statutorily required to do so. 68 This proposal
did not make much headway in Congress, and this sweeping exemption remains in place. However, Congress has required some agencies
that would otherwise fall within the exemption to provide notice and
comment,69 and many agencies have, as the recommendation urged,
voluntarily committed to following section 553 rulemaking procedures
even though they do not have to. 70 This recommendation rests on a
belief in the value of public input in rulemaking. Indeed, the underlying report begins with a lengthy discussion explaining why public participation in rulemaking is important. 71
4.

Increasing the Availability of Judicial Review

A final theme is the desire to make judicial review of agency action more easily available. Perhaps out of unease about making recommendations directly to the courts, the Conference did not take on
the most obvious barrier to review, namely, restrictive standing rules,
which were in flux at the time. 72 But it did address three more technical barriers.
First, Recommendation 68-7 73 urged Congress to eliminate the
generally applicable amount-in-controversy requirement, then
5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (2012).
ACUS Recommendation 69-8, 1 C.F.R. § 305.69-8, at 62.
69 See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 501(d) (2012) ("The provisions of section 553 of title 5 shall apply,
without regard to subsection (a)(2) of that section, to matters relating to loans, grants, or benefits under a law administered by the Secretary [of Veterans Affairs].").
70 See, e.g., Public Participation in Rulemaking, 36 Fed. Reg. 2532, 2532 (Feb. 5, 1971)
(referring to the ACUS recommendation and directing all agencies and offices within the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to follow § 553 requirements even if exempt under
subsection (a)(2)); Public Participation in Rulemaking, 36 Fed. Reg. 13,804, 13,804 (July 24,
1971) (instituting the same policy in the Department of Agriculture). In 2013, the Department
of Agriculture revoked the policy. See Revocation of Statement of Policy on Public Participation
in Rulemaking, 78 Fed. Reg. 64,194, 64,194 (Oct. 28, 2013). For criticism of that change, see
William Funk, U.S. Department of Agriculture's Revocation of 40+-Year-Old Policy on Engaging
in Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking, ADMIN. & REo. L. NEws, Winter 2014, at 15, 15-16.
71 Arthur E. Bonfield, Report of the Committee on Rulemaking in Support of Recommendation No. 16, in RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS, supra note 26, at 306, 306-09.
n See Elizabeth Magill, Standing for the Public: A Lost History, 95 VA. L. REv. 1131,
1151-59 (2009) (describing key federal appellate decisions at this time as simultaneously broadening and narrowing standing for members of the public).
73 ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATION 68-7, ELIMINATION OF JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT REQUIREMENT IN JUDICIAL REVIEW 1 (1968), https://www.acus.gov/recommendation/elimination-jurisdictional-amount-requirement-judicial-review.
67

68
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$10,000,74 for lawsuits against the government and its agents. Second,
Recommendation 69-1, Statutory Reform of the Sovereign Immunity
Doctrine, asserted that "[t]he technical legal defense of sovereign immunity ... has become in large measure unacceptable" and suggested
amending the APA to make clear that sovereign immunity does not
bar challenges to agency action. 75 Third, Recommendation 70-1
sought to eliminate dismissal of actions against agencies where the
plaintiff failed to identify the defendant properly; it called on the Department of Justice to draw such defects to the court's attention in
order to allow the plaintiff to amend its pleadings and on Congress to
make statutory amendments to liberalize standards for naming government defendants and serving process. 76 ACUS's then-Executive
Director, John Cushman, explained:
In innumerable cases a citizen's lawsuit against the Government has been dismissed solely because the United States or
one of its agencies was improperly identified in the citizen's
complaint, or could not be joined as a defendant. Thus, simply because of virtually inexplicable technical matters, the
merits of many just claims have not been considered. 77
Cushman's comment went specifically to the rigidity of pleading
standards in suits against the government, but it captures the general
sense underlying all three of these recommendations: existing law
posed pointless technical barriers to access to judicial review of agency
action. 78
Notably, all three of these recommendations were written into
law by Congress in 1976.79 They are among the Conference's most
important contributions.
74 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012) (explaining in supplemental notes that this section imposed
a $10,000 amount-in-controversy requirement from 1958 until 1980).
75 ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATION 69-1, STATUTORY REFORM OF
THE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY DOCTRINE 1 (1969), https://www.acus.gov/recommendation/statutory-reform-sovereign-immunity-doctrine.
76 ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATION 70-1, PARTIES DEFENDANT 1-2
(1970), http://www.acus.gov/recommendation/parties-defendant.
77 John F. Cushman, Administrative Conference of the United States: Report on the Fourth
Plenary Session, 22 ADMIN. L. REv. 623, 623 (1970).
78 One other, more targeted, recommendation probably falls into this category. Recommendation 68-8, Judicial Review of Interstate Commerce Commission Orders, proposed that Interstate Commerce Commission cases, which were then sent to a three-judge district court,
should instead be heard by the Courts of Appeals, as were the decisions of essentially all other
agencies. ADMIN. CoNFERENCE OF THE U .S., RECOMMENDATION 68-8, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION ORDERS 1 (1968), https://www.acus.gov/recommendation/
judicial-review-interstate-commerce-commission-orders.
79 See Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, § 1, 90 Stat. 2721 (rewriting§§ 702 and 703
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One Dog That Did Not Bark

One might also ask what ACUS's initial efforts ignored. By definition, that is a long list. But one concern loomed large at the time
and is notably absent, or at least hidden, in these recommendations:
agency capture. Reviewing the history of capture theory, Thomas
Merrill identifies 1967 as the starting point of the period in which understandings of the administrative process, and many efforts to reform
it, were informed, if not driven, by concerns over capture. 80 And capture was a "major preoccupation" 81 of the Landis Report. Landis did
not use that term, but he did discuss the phenomenon, observing that
"[i]ndustry orientation of agency members is a common criticism, frequently expressed in terms that the regulatees have become the regulators. "82 Yet nothing in the first three years was explicitly or overtly
responsive to that concern. Indeed, the only reference to "capture" in
any of the first twenty-two recommendations and reports appears, unexpectedly, in Arthur Bonfield's report supporting creation of a "Poor
People's Counsel." 83 Bonfield acknowledged that the folks actually
employed in such an office would probably themselves be not poor,
but middle class. He stressed, therefore, that "great pains should be
taken, and special procedures instituted, to prevent [the staff] from
being captured or dominated by a middle-class point of view." 84 That
is an interesting sort of regulatory capture, but not the classic conception of regulatory capture, in which the regulator serves the interests
of the regulated entity. Moreover, Bonfield did not apply his idea of
agency capture to a typical (or even an actual) agency.
Now the fact that one does not see the term "capture" thrown
about does not mean that the problem was not on the minds of memto remove the defense of sovereign immunity and to permit a party challenging agency action to
name the United States, the agency, or the appropriate officer as defendant); id. § 2 (eliminating
the amount-in-controversy requirement in suits "against the United States, any agency thereof,
or any officer or employee thereof in his official capacity").
80 See Merrill, supra note 16, at 1043, 1050. In particular, the late 1960s were a period of
particular prominence for Ralph Nader, the leading-and, at the time, enormously influentialdiagnoser and decrier of agency capture. See, e.g., EuGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN,
GOING BY THE BooK: THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS 44-45 (1982).
81 William J. Novak, A Revisionist History of Regulatory Capture, in PREVENTING R EGU·
LATORY CAPTURE 25, 29 (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2014).
82 Landis, supra note 42, at 70.
83 Arthur E . Bonfield, Report of the Committee on Rulemaking in Support of Recommendation No. 5, in RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS, supra note 26, at 79, 97, 106 (expressing
concern that a Poor People's Counsel might be "captured by the ideas and values of the government agencies before which it would represent the interests of the poor").
84 Id. at 98.
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bers of the Conference. Many of the recommendations did urge reforms that others were promoting as responses to agency capture. In
particular, capture theorists sought (1) greater and more effective
public participation in agency processes85 and (2) enhanced judicial
review of agency action. 86 As we have seen, so did ACUS. 87 It may be
that the recommendations along these lines were in fact indirectly responsive to concerns over capture, though demonstrating whether or
not that was the case would be challenging indeed.
It is also possible, however, that the silence regarding capture
reveals something about ACUS. It is crammed with experts, but most
work in federal agencies, and many of the others are lawyers who represent the firms that, on the traditional theory, have captured the
agencies. 88 These may not be the right people to perceive, or be bothered by, capture, if indeed it exists. Alternatively, they are the people
who would best know whether it does, and they may have concluded
that it does not. At a minimum, the silence on capture theory seems
to reflect a kind of politesse. If capture is a problem-a contested
proposition, of course-ACUS is not likely to be the entity that would
rise to decry it.
III.

THE SECOND TIME AROUND

ACUS 2.0 produced its first recommendation, on the subject of
preemption, in December 2010. 89 In the ensuing three years, it produced twenty-three more as well as one "statement."90 Recommencing four decades after it had issued the recommendations reviewed
above, what about ACUS's subjects and recommendations remained
constant, and what is new?

85 See, e.g., Lazarus & Onek, supra note 17, at 1074-76, 1092-1106 (decrying the captured
nature of the independent agencies and urging, among other things, fuller-and agencyfunded-public participation in agency processes as a remedy).
86 See Merrill, supra note 16, at 1052, 1064-66 (describing the 1970s doctrinal developments enhancing judicial power at the expense of agency power as resulting from a concern with
agency pathology in general and capture in particular).
87 See supra Parts II.A.3-4.
88 See Assembly, ADMIN. CoNF. U.S., http://www.acus.gov/assembly (last visited Sept. 5,
2015) (containing biographies of all voting and non-voting members).
89 ACUS Recommendation 2010-1, Agency Procedures for Considering Preemption of
State Law, 76 Fed. Reg. 81 (Jan. 3, 2011).
90 See Recommendations, ADMIN. CoNF. U.S., http://www.acus.gov/recommendations (last
visited Sept. 5, 2015) (containing recommendations).
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Four Major Themes Redux

The fundamental issues with which ACUS grapples are in some
ways unchanged. At a certain level of generality, transparency, delay,
and effective public participation remain the three essential themes.
Enhanced judicial review has largely disappeared, as discussed below.
But the details have changed.

1.

Transparency

Categorizing the recent recommendations requires some judgment calls, especially because transparency and public participation
overlap and some recommendations have elements of both. But one
plausible breakdown suggests that about a third of these recommendations are about transparency (a term that does now appear, with
some frequency, in the recommendations and reports). Most prominently, these include:
• Recommendation 2011-2, Rulemaking Comments. This recommendation calls on agencies to provide guidance on how to
submit effective comments, develop and announce clear policies for anonymous and late-filed comments, and make submitted comments quickly available online. 91
• Recommendation 2011-5, Incorporation by Reference. This is
the modem recommendation most directly concerned with the
"secret law" problem. It seeks to ameliorate, though not eliminate, the burdens involved in commenting on regulatory proposals, and finding actual legal requirements, when agencies'
proposed or final regulations incorporate by reference material
that is not freely available, often is copyrighted, and can cost
hundreds or thousands of dollars to purchase. 92
• Recommendation 2011-7, Federal Advisory Committee Act.
The Federal Advisory Committee Act ("FACA") 93 is a set of
transparency provisions seeking to bring sunshine to the agency
practice of relying on groups of nongovernmental advisors. 94
The recommendation accepts this congressional goal and aims
to identify measures that would alleviate the Act's procedural
91 ACUS Recommendation 2011-2, Rulemaking Comments, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,791, 48,791
(Aug. 9, 2011).
92 ACUS Recommendation 2011-5, Incorporation by Reference, 77 Fed. Reg. 2257,
2257-58 (Jan. 17, 2012).
93 Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-16 (2012).
94 ACUS Recommendation 2011-7, The Federal Advisory Committee Act-Issues and
Proposed Reforms, 77 Fed. Reg. 2261 , 2261-02 (Jan. 17, 2012).
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burdens while enhancing transparency and objectivity. 95 It is
alert to the possibility that in this area there can be too much of
a good thing, though it does not propose any significant rolling
back of transparency requirements for federal advisory
committees. 96
• Recommendation 2013-7,97 Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) Modernization Act of 2010. 98 The recommendation offers guidance to help increase transparency,
improve information sharing, and facilitate better agency reporting under the Government Performance and Results Act,99
a little-known 1993 law designed to "improve government performance by requiring agencies to set quantifiable performance
goals and then to assess their performance against their
goals. " 100
• Recommendation 2012-3, Immigration Removal Adjudication.
This is a sweeping recommendation touching on many aspects
of immigration adjudications. But one critical section focuses
on efforts to compile thorough and accurate data regarding the
immigration courts' workload and develop and publicize performance metrics. 101
In addition, five separate recommendations involve electronic
rulemaking. 102 While these most obviously belong in the public particId. at 2263-64.
Going outside this Article's self-imposed constraints, a later recommendation regarding
the Government in the Sunshine Act can be described just the same way-that is, it reflects
some backlash against transparency requirements but does not propose a major overhaul. See
ACUS Recommendation 2014-2, Government in the Sunshine Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 35,990, 35,991
(June 25, 2014).
97 ACUS Recommendation 2013-7, GPRA Modernization Act of 2010: Examining Constraints to, and Providing Tools for, Cross-Agency Collaboration, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,273 (Dec. 17,
95

96

2013).

98 Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) Modernization Act, 5 U.S.C. § 306;
31

u.s.c. §§ 1115-16, 1120-25 (2012).

99 Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 306, 31 U.S.C. §§ 1115-19, 31 U.S.C. §§ 9703-04, 39 U.S.C.

§§ 2801-05 (2012)).
100 William Funk, Political Checks on the Administrative Process, in A GumE TO Jumc IAL
AND POLITICAL REvrnw OF FEDERAL AGENCIES 211,240 (John F. Duffy & Michael Herz eds.,

2005).
101 ACUS Recommendation 2012-3, Immigration Removal Adjudication, 77 Fed. Reg.
47,804, 47,804-05 (Aug. 10, 2012).
102 See ACUS Recommendation 2011-1, Legal Considerations in e-Rulemaking, 76 Fed.
Reg. 48,789 (Aug. 9, 2011); ACUS Recommendation 2011-2, Rulemaking Comments, 76 Fed.
Reg. 48,791 (Aug. 9, 2011); ACUS Recommendation 2011-8, Agency Innovations in E-Rulemaking, 77 Fed. Reg. 2264 (Jan. 17, 2012); ACUS Recommendation 2013-4, The Administrative Re-
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ipation category, each also seeks to ensure the visibility and accessibility of the rulemaking process and its products.
Finally, Recommendation 2012-1, Regulatory Analysis, emphasizes transparency concerns. It encourages agencies to catalogue and
publicize generally applicable analysis requirements and, in any given
rulemaking, to identify explicitly which such requirements apply and
which do not. 103

2. Delay and Inefficiency
Concerns over delay still figure prominently in the modem recommendations, but the issue is no longer the near-obsession it once
was. This shift surely is not because the battle has been won. Rather,
it seems more likely that the concern has receded because of the move
from adjudication to rulemaking. 104 In the first twenty-two recommendations, the delays of concern were exclusively those arising in
adjudications. 105 Delays in the rulemaking process were not on anyone's radar. The more recent suite of recommendations remains concerned about delays in adjudications. Thus, Recommendation 2011-4,
regarding video hearings, is directed at agencies with high-volume
caseloads, urging them to consider videoconferencing as a way of improving efficiency or reducing costs. 106 Similarly, Recommendation
2012-3, regarding immigration removal adjudications, begins by noting
that "[o]ne of the biggest challenges identified in the adjudication of
immigration removal cases is the backlog of pending proceedings and
the limited resources to deal with the caseload." 107 Much of the recommendation is directed at understanding and reducing the backlog
and delays that characterize the present system. 108 Thus, ACUS 2.0
has addressed the most prominent aspects of delay in contemporary
adj udications. 109
cord in Informal Rulemaking, 78 Fed. Reg. 41 ,358 (July 10, 2013); ACUS Recommendation
2013-5, Social Media in Rulemaking, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,269 (Dec. 17, 2013).
103 ACUS Recommendation 2012-1 , Regulatory Analysis Requirements, 77 Fed. Reg.
47,801 , 47,801-02 (Aug. 10, 2012).
104 See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Rulemaking and the Administrative Procedure Act, 32
TuLSA L.J. 185, 188-90 (1996) (discussing the rise of agency rulemaking in the 1960s and 1970s).
105 See supra notes 42-55 and accompanying text (discussing ACUS's early recommendations aimed at eliminating delays).
106 ACUS Recommendation 2011-4, Agency Use of Video Hearings: Best Practices and
Possibilities for Expansion, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,795, 48,796 (Aug. 9, 2011).
107 ACUS Recommendation 2012-3, Immigration Removal Adjudication, 77 Fed. Reg.
47,804, 47,804 (Aug. 10, 2012)
108 Id. at 47,804-08.
109 Two other recommendations address inefficiencies in other aspects of the administrative
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Delay and inefficiency in the rulemaking process have also received some attention. The two most important instances are Recommendation 2012-1, concerning regulatory analysis, 110 and Statement
18, concerning OIRA review of regulations. 111 The first of these does
acknowledge the burdens imposed by the multiple analytic requirements that apply to agency rulemakings, 112 often labeled (though not
by ACUS) "paralysis by analysis." 113 But it is careful not to take a
position on whether existing requirements are excessive. 114 Nor does
it state that further analytic requirements should not be imposed. 115
Rather, it urges streamlining existing requirements to the extent possible, particularly by being alert to the possibility that overlapping requirements could be consolidated.11 6 Similarly, Statement 18
expresses concern that OIRA review simply takes too long, delaying
the rulemaking process, but it stops short of a formal recommendation

process. See ACUS Recommendation 2012-4, Paperwork Reduction Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 47,808,
47,808-10 (Aug. 10, 2012) (suggesting ways to streamline the process for approval of information
collection requests); ACUS Recommendation 2011-6, International Regulatory Cooperation, 77
Fed. Reg. 2259, 2260 (Jan. 17, 2012) (suggesting ways in which agencies could more efficiently
join forces with their foreign counterparts).
110 ACUS Recommendation 2012-1, Regulatory Analysis Requirements, 77 Fed. Reg.
47,801 (Aug. 10, 2012).
111

ACUS Statement# 18, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,275 (Dec. 17, 2013).

112

ACUS Recommendation 2012-1, 77 Fed. Reg. at 47,801-02.

113 See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, The Rhetoric and Reality of Regulatory Reform, 25 YALE J.
ON REG. 85, 89 (2008) ('" Paralysis by analysis' has become a cliche in regulatory circles today.").
114 "Although the Conference seeks to assure that existing analytic requirements are applied in the most efficient and transparent manner possible, it does not address whether the
number or nature of those requirements might not be reduced in light of their cumulative impact
on agencies." ACUS Recommendation 2012-1, 77 Fed. Reg. at 47,801. As per the request for
proposals, see Megan Kindelan, ACUS Announces 2 New RFPs: PRA and Regulatory Analysis,
AoMIN. CoNF. U .S. (Aug. 4, 2011, 1:42 PM), http://www.acus.gov/newsroom/administrative-fixblog/acus-announces-2-new-rfps-pra-and-regulatory-analysis ("The study should assess whether
or not the analysis requirements have caused an ossification of the rulemaking process."), the
underlying report devoted considerable attention to the ossification of the rulemaking process,
see CURTIS w. COPELAND, REGULATORY ANALYSIS REQUIREMENTS: A REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM 66--74 (2012). However, the committee producing the recommendation decided to leave any discussion of ossification out of the final recommendation. See COMM.
ON REGULATION, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., MINUTES: MAY 3, 2012, at 2 (2012), https://
www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Draft-Meeting-Minutes-5.03.2012-revised.pdf.
115 See ACUS Recommendation 2012-1, 77 Fed. Reg. at 47,801. An older recommendation
was more forceful: "Congress should reconsider the need for continuing statutory analytical requirements that necessitate broadly applicable analyses or action to address narrowly-focused
issues." ACUS Recommendation 93-4, Improving the Environment for Agency Rulemaking, 59
Fed. Reg. 4670, 4673 (Feb. 1, 1994), corrected at 59 Fed. Reg. 8507 (Feb. 22, 1994).
116

ACUS Recommendation 2012-1 , 77 Fed. Reg. at 47,801-02.
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and does not in any way call into question the value of OIRA
review.11 7
These three forays into the problem of rulemaking delays are
meaningful, but amount to less than one might have expected. After
all, recent decades have seen much wailing and gnashing of teeth regarding the "ossification" of the rulemaking process. 118 The ossification theme has been so pronounced, and ACUS's core mission so
focused on addressing delay and inefficiency, that it is somewhat surprising that ACUS 2.0 has not pursued the issue of delay and inefficiency in rulemaking as aggressively as ACUS 1.0 went after those
problems in adjudication.
Three possible explanations come to mind. One is simply that
twenty years ago ACUS did issue a recommendation aimed at reducing rulemaking ossification.11 9 It may just not have much more to say
on the matter.
Second, the ossification thesis is not universally accepted.
Though compelling, it is more anecdotal than data-driven, and several
recent empirical studies have suggested that it is overblown. 120 If indeed the rulemaking process is humming along efficiently, then that
would explain why ACUS has not addressed delays therein. This explanation is unconvincing, however. For one thing, there is just no
getting around the fact that the rulemaking process is enormously burdensome and time-consuming; the fact that it has not ground to a halt
does not mean that there are not opportunities to speed it up. In any
event, most observers (including most members of ACUS, one would
assume) in fact accept the ossification thesis, 121 notwithstanding the
mixed empirical studies.
The third explanation is that it is not clear that there is a consensus within ACUS, or within Washington, or among informed observers generally, in favor of an efficient and speedy rulemaking process.
ACUS Statement# 18, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,275 (Dec. 17, 2013).
See, e.g., Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 DuKE L.J. 1385, 1385-96 (1992).
119 See Recommendation 93-4, supra note 115.
120 See Anne Joseph O 'Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of
the Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REv. 889, 936 (2008) (suggesting that volume of
agency rulemaking shows it is not ossified); Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Testing
the Ossification Thesis: An Empirical Examination of Federal Regulatory Volume and Speed,
1950-1990, 80 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1414, 1475 (2012). But see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Rulemaking
Ossification Is Real: A Response to Testing the Ossification Thesis, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1493,
1493-98, 1502-03 (2012).
121 See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 120, at 1493, 1498; Yackee & Yackee, supra note 120, at
1418-19.
117

118
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It is hard to be in favor of delays in adjudication as a systemic matter.
Of course, as between the parties to an adjudication, delay will often
favor at least one of them. But as a systemic matter, that benefit will
generally be precisely offset by the disadvantage to the other party.
Moreover, adjudication resolves legal rights; the systemic interest
would be in clarifying legal rights rather than having lingering uncertainty. There is no legitimate interest in-and much human and economic cost to-delaying the resolution of legal rights beyond the time
necessary to do the job properly. But rulemaking is different.
Rulemaking generally involves the establishment of new legal requirements.122 Accordingly, those who are dubious about the value of new
regulations may systemically value an inefficient rulemaking process.
Exactly this justification has been offered in favor of the difficult process for enacting legislation under the U.S. Constitution. 123 And a
longstanding argument in favor of a nondelegation doctrine with teeth
is that we should be concerned about having too much law, 124 and that
allowing delegations to agencies will result in more law precisely because it is easier for agencies to write regulations than it is for Congress to enact laws. 125 The near-complete partisan division over
legislative proposals to expand the APA's rulemaking requirements 126
seems to confirm this assessment.
In short, ACUS's tendency to steer away from the ossification
issue reflects something new, important, and disheartening about the
field of administrative law. Disagreements over regulatory substance
are affecting debates over rulemaking procedure in a way that is new
(and does not infect debates over adjudicatory procedure). One
would imagine people who thought agencies should issue lots of regulations and people who thought they should issue almost none could
122 "Generally," because rulemaking can of course also involve the elimination or dilution
of regulatory requirements.
123 See, e.g. , John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 CoLUM. L. REV.
1, 72-73 (2001).
124 See Mila Sohoni, The Idea of "Too Much Law," 80 FORDHAM L. REv. 1585, 1612
(2012).
125 See, e.g., Environmental Regulations, the Economy, and Jobs: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Env't & Econ. of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 112th Cong. 44 (2011)
(statement of Christopher DeMuth, D.C. Searle Senior Fellow, American Enterprise Institute
for Public Policy Research) ("Regulatory delegation ... has permitted the Congress to accommodate the never-ending political demands for government intervention to a far greater degree
than legislation alone could have accomplished . . .. The size, scope, reticulation, and minuteness
of the modern 'nanny state' is an artifact of regulatory delegation: it could not have been
achieved and it could not be managed through direct legislation.").
126 See, e.g. , H.R. REP. No. 113-237, at 17-18 (2013); 157 CoNo. REC. H8105 (daily ed. Dec.
2, 2011) (vote on Regulatory Accountability Act).
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still agree on a sensible process for producing those regulations. 127 At
present, that does not seem to be the case.
3.

Enhancing Public Participation in Agency Proceedings

The importance of ensuring that rulemaking is open to effective
participation by all members of the public remains a recurrent concern in the more recent round of recommendations. It is very much at
the heart of the five recommendations regarding e-rulemaking. 128 At
the same time, ther.e has been a meaningful shift. The first set of recommendations was concerned with ensuring that representatives of affected interests could meaningfully participate. The most obvious
example is the 1968 recommendation regarding the need to ensure
adequate representation of the interests -of poor people in rulemaking.129 It was an instantiation of the interest representation model of
the "reformed" administrative law. That meant, in part, the abandonment of a model in which there was such a thing as "the public interest" as opposed to the sum of various particular interests.13° Indeed,
one of the dissenting statements regarding the proposal objected to it
on exactly this ground: "I consider unsound attempts to fractionate
the public interest which is properly the concern of our Federal administrative agencies: " 131
In the modern era, the "public interest" remains elusive. But the
interest representation model has itself crumbled. Two alternatives
vie to replace it. One, discussed below, is the idea of presidential control.132 A second involves direct citizen engagement. Much of the
most optimistic writing about new technologies and governance assumes that individuals will be able to participate directly, not through
representatives. 133 Whether that might in fact happen very much re127 Members of the Administrative Conference did exactly that in an important recommendation from the early 1990s. See ACUS Recommendation 93-4, Improving the Environment for
Agency Rulemaking, 59 Fed. Reg. 4670 (Feb. 1, 1994).
12s See supra note 102.
129 ACUS Recommendation 68-5, Representation of the Poor in Agency Rulemaking of
Direct Consequence to Them, 1 C.F.R. § 305.68-5 (1993).
130 See supra Part 11.A.3.
131 RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS, supra note 26, at 20 (dissenting statement of Robert W. Graham opposing Recommendation 68-5).
132 See infra Part III.B.7.
133 See, e.g., John M. de Figueiredo, E-Rulemaking: Bringing Data to Theory at the Federal
Communications Commission, 55 D UKE L.J. 969, 975 (2006) (describing the view that e-rulemaking will enable individual participation and so "enhance[ ] the democratic process in rulemaking
which, in turn, increases bureaucratic legitimacy and federal government credibility, strengthens
individual autonomy and rights of self-governance, increases public understanding of rulemaking, and enhances the accountability of administrative agencies to other branches of govern-
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mains to be seen. ACUS's recommendations have been somewhat agnostic on the question. The recent recommendations, however, are
more open to the idea of direct participation by affected interests and
do not focus much on adequate representation of particular interests.

4.

Judicial Review

Of the four primary themes of the first set of recommendations,
judicial review is the one that has largely disappeared from the modern counterparts. Only three recommendations concern judicial review, and each addresses an issue that is relatively narrow and
technical. Recommendation 2013-6 explores the contours of the
courts' occasional, and contested, practice of remanding a defective
agency action without setting that action aside. 134 Recommendation
2013-4 offers suggestions regarding how agencies should compile, and
what should be included in, the "record" in an informal rulemaking. 135
Finally, Recommendation 2012-6 suggests a statutory amendment to a
technical provision regarding the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal
Claims. 136
Issues of judicial review remain, and will always be, central to the
overall administrative law regime. ACUS will always have a judicial
review committee. But of the four primary themes of the early years,
this is the one that seems most dilute in the contemporary counterparts. Not only are there only three recommendations from the judicial review committee, but none concerns what was the focus of the
judicial recommendations by ACUS 1.0-expanding the availability of
judicial review. Presumably, this shift reflects (1) the fact that, in part
thanks to ACUS, the availability of judicial review has been expanded
since the 1960s, and (2) some loss of enthusiasm for the benefits of
judicial review for the administrative process since the pre- Vermont
ment") (citations omitted); Beth Simone Noveck, Evolving Democracy for the 21st Century 6-8,
http://cairns.typepad.com/files/evolving-democracy.pdf (paper prepared for the Club de Madrid
2011 Annual Conference, Nov. 8-9, 2011, New York City) (imagining broad, direct public input
into legislation).
134 ACUS Recommendation 2013-6, Remand Without Vacatur, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,272 (Dec.
17, 2013).
135 ACUS Recommendation 2013-4, The Administrative Record in Informal Rulemaking,
78 Fed. Reg. 41 ,358 (July 10, 2013). ACUS members in the early years would have been perplexed by this topic, which would have struck them as involving an oxymoron. It is a sign of how
modern understandings of the nature of informal rulemaking, and the review of informal
rulemaking, have developed that there could be a recommendation on this topic at all.
136 ACUS Recommendation 2012-6, Reform of 28 U.S.C. Section 1500, 78 Fed. Reg. 2939,
2940-41 (Jan. 15, 2013).
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Yankee 137 days of an extremely muscular judicial role, particularly in
the D.C. Circuit.
B.

Brave New World

The previous section emphasized the common themes between
our two time periods. That commonality is real, and at a high level of
generality these basic concerns-transparency, efficiency, participation, and appropriate judicial review-seem perpetual, central issues
of the administrative state. But, as we saw, this description hides
some equally important changes regarding the specifics. In addition,
new themes have developed and new issues arisen that were not even
a gleam in ACUS's eye in the late 1960s. This section turns to those
issues.
1.

Technology

The biggest single transformation in agency operations between
1968 and 2010 has resulted from the rise of the personal computer and
related technologies, especially the Internet. In ACUS's first three
years, not a single recommendation involved new technological possibilities. Indeed, from a technological point of view, there is little if
anything in these recommendations that could not have been produced in the years 1868 to llflO. The recommendations make no mention-none-of computers. 138
The same year the Administrative Conference Act was signed
into law, IBM's most compelling and popular exhibit at the New York
World's Fair was the selectric typewriter. 139 Inklings of the technologi137 Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (bringing to a halt
lower courts' tendency to impose on agencies judge-made procedural requirements that lacked a
firm statutory or constitutional foundation) .
138 There is one such mention in one of the underlying reports. The report regarding Recommendation 69-6, regarding the compilation of statistics, notes, somewhat quaintly:
In the past, statistical study has been laborious. Today, every agency has its own
computer facilities or, at nominal expense, can arrange for the use of the facilities
of some other agency. The Committee is confident that, with such capability,
[agencies will improve regulatory outcomes through] continuing statistical study of
administrative procedures . . ..
Staff of the Office of the Chairman, Report of the Committee on Licenses and Authorizations in
Support of Recommendation No. 14, in RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS, supra note 26, at
287,295.
139 See ROBERT W. RYDELL ET AL., FAIR AMERICA 107-09 (2000) (reproducing photograph of IBM pavilion designed to mimic type ball from selectric typewriter and noting that 1964
World's Fair attendees enjoyed IBM's "state-of-the-art exhibit[]"); International Business Machines, NEw YoRK WoRLD's FAIR 1964/1965, http://www.nywf64.com/ibm02.shtml (last visited
Sept. 5, 2015) (describing significance of design).
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cal revolution to come were present during ACUS l.0's run, but the
real transformation occurred precisely during the decade and a half
that ACUS had left the scene. So perhaps the largest divergence between the old recommendations and the new ones is that most of the
latter assume the existence of, and rely on, the Internet and agency
websites. That is hardly a surprise, but reviewing the old recommendations does remind us of just how thoroughly new technologies have
transformed how agencies go about their business.
One way of seeing this change is by matching up certain old recommendations with their ACUS 2.0 equivalents. For example, the
very first recommendation, 68-1, concerned the adequacy of agency
hearing facilities, stressing the need for more hearing rooms and space
that was both functional and, in a word, classier. 140 The counterpart
among the new recommendations would be 2011-4, Agency Use of
Video Hearings. 141 Both are concerned with ensuring that the agency
has available a functional and sufficient "place" in which to conduct
adjudications. 142 In 1968, that meant improving physical facilities; in
2011, it meant creation of virtual spaces through technology. Similarly, the recommendation on ensuring adequate representation of the
poor in rulemaking proceedings has a contemporary counterpart in
the several recommendations regarding e-rulemaking, which generally
have the goal of increasing the visibility of rulemakings, reducing the
cost of participating therein, and making agencies directly accessible
to individuals. 143
The scope of this profound technological change is also made apparent by identifying recommendations that are simply obsolete because of technological developments. That category would seem to
include most of the recommendations having to do with getting information-indexes for the CFR, the parallel table of statutory authorities and regulatory provisions, the Consumer Bulletin, and the
improved Government Manual (the Manual still exists, but its function has largely been overtaken by agency websites). 144 Thus, the ParACUS Recommendation 68-1, Adequate Hearing Facilities, 1 C.F.R. § 305.68-1 (1988).
ACUS Recommendation 2011-4, Agency Use of Video Hearings: Best Practices and
Possibilities for Expansion, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,795, 48,796 (Aug. 9, 2011).
142 Compare ACUS Recommendation 68-1 , 1 C.F.R. § 305.68-1, at 52 ("Administrative
hearings of the Federal Government should be conducted in dignified, efficient hearing rooms,
appropriate as to size, arrangement, and furnishings."), with ACUS Recommendation 2011-4, 76
Fed. Reg. at 48,795-96 (advising agencies to consider conducting hearings via videoconference
because of the flexibility, efficiency, and cost savings that this technology offers).
143 See supra notes 102, 129, and accompanying text. The shift here is not just technological. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
144 See supra Part 11.A.l.
140
141
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allel Table addressed in Recommendation 68-3 is still produced,
published in the Index and Finding Aids volume of the CFR-and,
more relevant for most people, available online. 145 But it is a fairly
obsolete finding aid; most researchers would find this information far
more quickly with an online search. And if one does it that way,
whether the official Table is accurate simply does not matter. The
middleman is omitted; in essence the searcher herself does what this
recommendation asked the agency to do.
Yet a third way of demonstrating the central importance of technological developments is simply to identify the number of ACUS recommendations that specifically address how agencies might or should
employ new technologies. Not counting recommendations that make
a passing reference to, say, the need to post something on the agency
website, these include 'at least the following: Recommendation 2011-1
(legal considerations in e-rulemaking),146 Recommendation 2011-2
(rulemaking comments), 147 Recommendation 2011-4 (video hearings),148 Recommendation 2011-8 (innovations in e-rulemaking),149
Recommendation 2013-4 (rulemaking record), 150 and Recommendation 2013-5 (social media in rulemaking). 151
2.

Progress

Stressing the thematic congruence leaves one with the impression
that the administrative process is stuck in place, going round the same
track over and over. In some respects, that is no doubt the case. But
it is indisputable that enormous gains have been made on at least two
fronts, thanks largely to the move online: the opportunities for public
participation in rulemaking and the availability of agency materials
and information about agency operations have massively increased.
Consider one example. Recommendation 2011-5 addresses the phe145 See Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules, C.F.R. INDEX 833 (2014), http://www.gpo
.gov/help/parallel_table.pdf.
146 ACUS Recommendation 2011-1 , Legal Considerations in e-Rulemaking, 76 Fed. Reg.
48,789 (Aug. 9, 2011).
147 ACUS Recommendation 2011-2, Rulemaking Comments, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,791 (Aug. 9,
2011).
148 ACUS Recommendation 2011-4, Agency Use of Video Hearings: Best Practices and
Possibilities for Expansion, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,795 (Aug. 9, 2011).
149 ACUS Recommendation 2011-8, Agency Innovations in E-Rulemaking, 77 Fed. Reg.
2264 (Jan. 17, 2012).
150 ACUS Recommendation 2013-4, The Administrative Record in Informal Rulemaking,
78 Fed. Reg. 41,358 (July 10, 2013).
151 ACUS Recommendation 2013-5, Social Media in Rulemaking, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,269
(Dec. 17, 2013).
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nomenon of incorporation by reference. 152 The problem here arises
when agencies reference privately developed standards in regulations
but do not reprint them. 153 These standards are often copyrighted, can
be difficult to find, and may require purchase for hundreds or
thousands of dollars if someone wants to actually see them. 154 At the
proposed rule stage, this interferes with the opportunity to comment;
at the final rule stage, it interferes with the ability to comply. Without
wading into the merits of ACUS's proposal and the debates it has engendered,155 suffice it to say that the fact that this has generated controversy at all is a sign of a significant shift since the era of ACUS's
first twenty-two recommendations. Private standards are relatively
hard to find and expensive, given that publicly created law is now
available to everyone, for free, on the Internet. But they are not really harder to obtain than publicly created law once was. In 1968,
reading a regulation required a trip to the library or an expensive
purchase of a hard copy of the CFR. Commenting on a proposed rule
also required a trip to the library or an expensive subscription, this
time in order to obtain the Federal Register. The reason that the difficulty of viewing incorporated private standards has become so salient
is not that it is harder than it used to be; it is that everything else has
become so much easier. 156 Whatever the merits of this particular debate, the huge strides in the availability of law generally should be
celebrated.
3.

The Shift from Adjudication to Rulemaking

Historically, agencies relied on adjudication for policy formulation.157 The 1970s saw a fundamental shift toward rulemaking as the
primary tool for agency policy formulation. The shift was starting but
not yet in full swing when ACUS began operations. 158 In the following
152 ACUS Recommendation 2011-5, Incorporation by Reference, 77 Fed. Reg. 2257 (Jan.
17, 2012).
153 Id. at 2257-58.
154 See id. at 2258; Nina A. Mendelson, Private Control over Access to the Law: The Perplexing Federal Regulatory Use of Private Standards, 112 MIC H . L. R E V. 737, 737, 751-52 (2014).
155 Two invaluable discussions are ACUS staff attorney Emily Bremer's report, later published as Emily S. Bremer, Incorporation by Reference in an Open-Government A ge, 36 HARV.
J.L. & Pus. Po L'Y 131, 150-53 (2013), and Mendelson, supra note 154.
156 See Bremer, supra note 155, at 152-53.
157 See Pierce, supra note 104, at 188.
158 For example, the Federal Trade Commission proposed its first trade regulation rule,
regarding the labeling of cigarettes, in 1964. Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of
Cigarettes in Relation to the Health Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 8324 (July 2, 1964). It
bad issued only a handful of others, and its authority to do so remained contested, when, in 1969,
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decades, the shift became complete. Since most agencies now make
most of their important decisions through rulemaking (the NLRB remains an outlier159 ), it is hardly a surprise that ACUS too has shifted
its focus. In ACUS 1.0, nine or more of the twenty-two recommendations were specific to adjudication; eight if one does not count the
recommendation concerning hearing examiners, who could, after all,
conceivably preside over a formal rulemaking. 160 Only four were specific to rulemaking161 and the remainder were relevant to both. As
one would expect, the ratio flips in the more recent twenty-five recommendations: eleven are specific to rulemaking162 and only three or
four are specific to adjudication. 163
it proposed requiring gas stations to post the octane level of the gasoline they were selling.
Gasoline Dispensing Pumps, 34 Fed. Reg. 12,449 (July 30, 1969). The rule was issued in final
form in 1971, Posting of Minimum Octane Numbers on Gasoline Dispensing Pumps, 36 Fed.
Reg. 23,871 (Dec. 16, 1971), and upheld by the D.C. Circuit two years later in the well-known
case of National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC. 482 F.2d 672, 698 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
159 See Zev J. Eigen & Sandro Garofalo, Less Is More: A Case for Structural Reform of the
National Labor Relations Board, 98 MINN. L. REv. 1879, 1884-85 (2014).
160 These were Recommendations 68-1 (adequate hearing facilities), 68-6 (delegation of
final decisionmaking authority), 69-5 (duplicative FAA safety hearings), 69-7 (consideration of
alternatives in licensing), 69-9 (recruitment and training of hearing examiners), 70-2 (SEC noaction letters), 70-3 (summary decisions in formal adjudication), 70-4 (discovery in formal adjudication), and 70-5 (guidance regarding Renegotiation Board determinations). In addition, two
recommendations concerned judicial review and enforcement of agency orders-68-8 (review of
ICC orders) and 69-2 (enforcement of NLRB orders). See Recommendations (1968-1995), Ao.
MIN. CoNF. U.S., http://www.acus.gov/recommendations/historical-recommendations-1%8-1995
(last visited Sept. 5, 2015).
161 These were Recommendations 68-3 (parallel statement of statutory authorities and
rules), 68-5 (representation of the poor in rulemaking proceedings), 69-4 (CFR indexes), and 698 (elimination of exemption from notice-and-comment requirement). See id.
162 These were Recommendations 2010-1 (preemption), 2011-1 (legal considerations in erulemaking), 2011-2 (rulemaking comments), 2011-5 (incorporation by reference in regulations),
2011-8 (e-rulemaking), 2012-1 (regulatory analysis requirements), 2012-2 (midnight rules), 20132 (benefit-cost analysis in independent agency rulemakings), 2013-4 (the record in informal
rulemaking), and 2013-5 (use of social media in rulemaking), as well as Statement# 18 (timeliness of OIRA regulatory review). See Recommendations (2010-Present), ADMIN. CoNF. U.S.,
http://www.acus.gov/recommendations/current-recommendations-2010-present (last visited Sept.
5, 2015).
163 These were Recommendations 2011-4 (video hearings), 2012-3 (immigration removal
adjudication), 2012-8 (inflation adjustments for civil penalties), and 2013-1 (consistency in social
security adjudications). In fact , in recent years the Conference has devoted more attention to
adjudication than this tally implies. In particular, the Social Security Administration has commissioned a number of projects. See generally Gerald K. Ray & Jeffrey S. Lubbers, A Government Success Story: How Data Analysis by the Social Security Appeals Council (with a Push from
the Administrative Conference of the United States) Is Transforming Social Security Disability
Adjudication, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1575 (2015). The general point-that the move to
rulemaking as the preferred, and almost exclusive, tool for policymaking is reflected in the Conference 's output-stands, however.
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The Shift in Specific Agencies

The recommendations and reports from ACUS 1.0 are populated
by ghosts. The late and sometimes lamented Interstate Commerce
Commission and the Renegotiation Board were each the subject of a
specific recommendation. 164 Other agencies that received significant
attention, such as the NLRB, the SEC, and the FAA, while still important, do not loom as large as they once did. Absent from the first
set of recommendations, of course, are the whole range of agencies
created since 1970 with jurisdiction over health, safety, consumer protection, and the environment. Recommendation 68-4 hints at the consumer-protection movement, endorsing the idea of a "consumer
bulletin," 165 but the Consumer Product Safety Commission and the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau did not yet exist. 166 Not to
mention three 600-pound gorillas created in 1970: the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration, 167 the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration,168 and, perhaps most important, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"). President Nixon created the
EPA through an Executive Order, Reorganization Plan No. 3,169
which was submitted to Congress on July 9, 1970. ACUS's fourth plenary session, the last to be considered in this survey, had taken place
just five weeks earlier, on June 2nd and 3rd. 170 Little did they know.

5.

The Shift in Regulatory Missions and Agendas

Behind the change in particular agencies lies a more fundamental
change in the nature of regulation. ACUS came into being when
traditional economic regulation still dominated federal agency activity. Over the course of the following decade, Congress, with strong
bipartisan support, moved decisively away from regulating prices and
164 RECOMMENDATION 68-8, supra note 78 (judicial review of Interstate Commerce Commission orders); RECOMMENDATION 70-5, supra note 41 (practices and procedures of the Renegotiation Board).
165 RECOMMENDATION 68-4, supra note 35, at 1.
166 See Consumer Product Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 92-573, 86 Stat. 1207, 1210 (1972) (establishing the Consumer Product Safety Commission); Creating the Consumer Bureau, CONSUMER
FIN. PROT. BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau/creatingthebureau/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2015) (noting that Congress created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau in
2010).
167 See All About OSHA , OccuPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., https://www.osha
.gov/Publications/3302-06N-2006-English.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2015).
168 See Highway Safety Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-605, 84 Stat. 1713, 1739.
169 Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,623 (Oct. 6, 1970).
170 See Historical Timeline, ADMIN. CoNF. U .S., https://www.acus.gov/50/timeline/1970%20%201979 (last visited Sept. 5, 2015).
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market entry and toward regulating externalities. These substantive
shifts are not on the surface of any of the ACUS recommendations,
but they are lurking in the background.

6.

Increasing Attention to the Problem of "Silos"

The first twenty-two ACUS recommendations treat agencies as
freestanding entities. Several address the internal operations of agencies, but none addresses, or even seems aware of, issues regarding the
relationships among agencies, or between agencies and the White
House or other regulatory actors, including private parties who are
working with or for the agency. This silence cannot possibly be attributed to an inherent blind spot. 171 To the contrary, this is just the sort
of issue to which one would expect both the public and the governmental members of ACUS to be acutely alert.
In contrast, the latter group of recommendations reflects a keen
awareness that agencies operate in a complex world. Almost a third
fit this description, including the recommendations that address preemption (i.e., the relationship between federal and state regulators), 172
the ethical obligations of government contractors, 173 federal advisory
committees,174 the use of third parties to determine whether regulated
entities are in compliance, 175 international regulatory cooperation, 176
coordination and cooperation among agencies with overlapping responsibilities, 177 and regulatory review by OIRA.178
The explanation for this shift is beyond the scope of this Article.
Three factors may be at work. First, as the federal government continues to increase in complexity and scope, with multiple agencies pos171 Cf supra Part III.B (suggesting that ACUS's failure to discuss agency capture may be
attributable to a blind spot).
172 Recommendation 2010-1 , supra note 89.
173 ACUS Recommendation 2011-3, Compliance Standards for Government Contractor
Employees-Personal Conflicts of Interest and Use of Certain Non-Public Information, 76 Fed.
Reg. 48,792 (Aug. 9, 2011).
174 ACUS Recommendation 2011-7, The Federal Advisory Committee Act-Issues and
Proposed Reforms, 77 Fed. Reg. 2261 (Jan. 17, 2012).
175 ACUS Recommendation 2012-7, Agency Use of Third-Party Programs to Assess Regulatory Compliance, 78 Fed. Reg. 2941 (Jan. 15, 2013).
176 ACUS Recommendation 2011-6, International Regulatory Cooperation, 77 Fed. Reg.
2259 (Jan. 17, 2012).
177 See ACUS Recommendation 2012-5, Improving Coordination of Related Agency Responsibilities, 77 Fed. Reg. 47,810 (Aug. 10, 2012); ACUS Recommendation 2013-7, GPRA
Modernization Act of 2010: Examining Constraints to, and Providing Tools for, Cross-Agency
Collaboration, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,273 (Dec. 17, 2013).
178 ACUS Statement# 18, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,275 (Dec. 17, 2013).

2015]

AC US-AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-THEN AND NOW

1249

sessing overlapping responsibilities,179 the silo effect and related issues
have become more salient and inescapable. Second, technological
changes have made the silo effect particularly problematic in settings
where information systems cannot communicate with each other. Indeed, this is the most familiar use of the term, as in "information silos."180 It could be that the government's information silo problem,
and these technological challenges generally, have sensitized observers to corresponding problems outside the information technology setting. Third-and this is a central point of this article-ACUS is
inescapably subject to the intellectual currents of the world in which it
operates. For whatever reason, agency interactions have become a focus of academics and government officials alike in recent years. 181 Accordingly, it is hardly a surprise to see these issues appear in ACUS's
recommendations.
7.

Presidential Management

As mentioned in Part 11,182 ACUS's early years preceded the
"counter-reformation" and its emphasis on presidential oversight.
The President is quite invisible in the first twenty-two recommendations. Indeed, executive-as opposed to independent-agencies are
relatively hidden; the independent regulatory commissions overshadow them. In the modern counterparts, that has changed. Presidential oversight generally, and regulatory review in particular, are
taken as given; ACUS's goal is not to rethink these phenomena but
rather to make such supervision as efficient and useful as possible. 183

179 See generally Michael Doran, Legislative Organization and Administrative Redundancy ,
91 B.U . L. REV. 1815 (2011).

180

See Stacy A. Baird, Government Role and the Interoperability Ecosystem, 5 1/S: J.L. &
Soc'v 219, 243-45 (2009).
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181 See, e.g., Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, A gency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space,
125 HARV. L. REV. 1131 (2012); Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in
Administrative Law, 2006 Su P. CT. REv. 201; Jason Marisam, Interagency Administration, 45
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 183 (2013).
182
183

See supra Part IL

See ACUS Recommendation 2012-1, Regulatory Analysis Requirements, 77 Fed. Reg.
47,801 (Aug. 10, 2012); ACUS Recommendation 2013-2, Benefit-Cost Analysis at Independent
Regulatory Agencies, 78 Fed. Reg. 41,355 (July 10, 2013); ACUS Statement# 18, 78 Fed. Reg. at
76,275. Another modern recommendation that reflects the new presidentialism is Recommendation 2012-2, Midnight Rules. ACUS Recommendation 2012-2, Midnight Rules, 77 Fed. Reg.
47,802 (Aug. 10, 2012).
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CONCLUSION:
THE CONTINUING "REFORMATION OF AMERICAN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW"

Richard Stewart's The Reformation of American Administrative
Law appeared in 1975. The reformation Professor Stewart identified was underway but not yet complete when ACUS got to work.
Several of ACUS's early projects reflect the reformation; Recommendation 68-5, 185 regarding the representation of the poor in rulemaking,
is the purest example. But administrative law continued and continues to be reformed; the interest representation model no longer dominates, either descriptively or normatively. And just as the
transformations that Stewart described can be seen in the early ACUS
projects, so the transformations that have taken place since then can
be seen in the projects that the new ACUS has undertaken. Among
these changes, the rise of new technologies looms largest. If the administrative state is truly being refashioned by the new technologies,
not only will we see it in ACUS's recommendations, but those recommendations will themselves help shape and define the new era, as they
have for half a century.
184

Stewart, supra note 6.
ACUS Recommendation 68-5, Representation of the Poor in Agency Rulemaking of
Direct Consequence to Them, 1 C.F.R. § 305.68-5 (1993).
184
185
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APPENDIX A

Recommendations from ACUS's First First Three Years
1. Recommendation 68-1, Adequate Hearing Facilities, 186 urges

the General Services Administration to maintain an inventory of administrative hearing facilities, develop hearing spaces suitable to the
seriousness of an adjudicatory proceeding, and coordinate with the
federal and state judiciaries concerning the possibility of using judicial
courtrooms for administrative hearings.
2. Recommendation 68-2, U.S. Government Organization Manual,187 points out that the agency-specific descriptions included in the
Manual are often "outdated, unrevealing, cumbersome, or otherwise
deficient. " 188 It urges each agency required to submit information on
its organization and functions for publication in the Manual under 5
U.S.C. § 552, to assign the drafting task to an office that is up to the
task, and to include in the description information concerning how
additional information about the agency can be obtained.
3. Recommendation 68-3, Parallel Table of Statutory Authorities
and Rules (2 CFR Ch. 1). 189 The Parallel Table is a two-column list of
all statutory provisions on which agencies have relied in issuing regulations that appear in the Code of Federal Regulations, together with
the portion of the CFR where those regulations are found . This recommendation reports that the table is inaccurate and incomplete. It
urges agencies to review their entries and submit corrections to the
Office of the Federal Register ("OFR") and encourages the OFR to
include in the table not only provisions cited by agencies in the formal
statement of authority, but also provisions cited in preambles and
codified text.
4. Recommendation 68-4, Consumer Bulletin, 190 recommends the
publication, on a trial basis, of a bulletin, circulated to "the press, consumer organizations, public and scholastic libraries, and individuals
who request to be put on the mailing list," 191 describing recent federal
agency actions of interest and significance to consumers.

186 ACU S R ecommendation 68-1 . Adequate H e aring Facilities, 1 C.F.R. § 305.68-1 (1988).
187 R ECOMMENDATION 68-2, supra note 29.
188 Id. a t 1.
189 R ECOMMENDATION 68-3, supra note 31.
190 R ECOMMENDATION
191

Id. a t 1.

68-4, supra note 35.
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5. Recommendation 68-5, Representation of the Poor in Agency

Rulemaking of Direct Consequence to Them. 192 The most controversial of the early recommendations, this multipart recommendation
proposes several initiatives to ensure that federal agencies do not
overlook the interests of poor people when conducting rulemakings.
First, it urges federal agencies to undertake affirmative efforts and
outreach to ensure they receive input from poor people with regard to
rulemakings that may have a substantial effect on the poor. These
efforts could include holding hearings in convenient locations, directly
soliciting submissions from representatives of the poor, conducting
field surveys of poor people, and setting up advisory committees consisting of representatives of poor people. In addition, when necessary,
agencies should reimburse individuals for expenses or lost wages attributable to rulemaking participation. Third, Congress should authorize and fund a quasi-governmental entity to serve as "People's
Counsel," the staff of which would "represent the interests of the poor
in all Federal administrative rulemaking substantially affecting the
poor."193
6. Recommendation 68-6, Delegation of Final Decisional Authority Subject to Discretionary Review by the Agency, 194 encourages development of intermediate appellate panels within agencies and greater
reliance on making initial decisions final, though subject to discretionary review, so as to reduce the burdens on agency heads of having to
review all formal adjudications.
7. Recommendation 68-7, Elimination of Jurisdictional Amount
Requirement in Judicial Review, 195 urges elimination of the amount-incontroversy requirement contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal-question jurisdiction) in cases challenging agency action.
8. Recommendation 68-8, Judicial Review of Interstate Commerce Commission Orders,1 96 recommends that Interstate Commerce
Commission cases that are currently sent to a three-judge district
court should instead be heard by the Courts of Appeals.
9. Recommendation 69-1, Statutory Reform of the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine. 197 Asserting that "[t]he technical legal defense of
192 ACUS Recommendation 68-5, Representation of the Poor in Agency Rulemaking of
Direct Consequence to Them, 1 C.F.R. § 305.68-5 (1993).
193 Id. at 58.
194 ACUS Recommendation 68-6, Delegation of Final Decisional Authority Subject to Discretionary Review by the Agency, 1 C.F.R. § 305.68-6 (1993).
195 RECOMMENDATION 68-7, supra note 73.
196 RECOMMENDATION 68-8, supra note 78.
197 RECOMMENDATION 69-1, supra note 75.
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sovereign immunity ... has become in large measure unacceptable," 198
this recommendation seeks amendments to sections 702 and 703 of
the AP A to make clear that sovereign immunity does not bar challenges to agency action.
10. Recommendation 69-2, Judicial Enforcement of Orders of the
National Labor Relations Board, 199 reasserts a recommendation from
the temporary Administrative Conference of 1961-62 that orders of
the NLRB, like those of all or most other agencies, be made automatically judicially enforceable, without any further proceeding to obtain
judicial confirmation of the orders' terms.
11. Recommendation 69-3, Publication of a "Guide to Federal
Reporting Requirements. "200 Noting the popularity of the Guide to Record Retention Requirements, this endorses a counterpart publication
listing agency-by-agency reporting requirements and their statutory or
regulatory bases.
12. Recommendation 69-4, Analytical Subject-Indexes to Selected
Volumes of the Code of Federal Regulations,201 urges all agencies contributing "substantially" to the CFR to determine whether analytic
subject indexes for their CFR volumes would be appropriate, and, if
so, to produce such indexes.
13. Recommendation 69-5, Elimination of Duplicative Hearings
in FAA Safety De-certification Cases, 202 recommends that the FAA
abandon its practice of conducting full trial-type hearings in order to
make a preliminary determination that licenses or permits should be
revoked prior to referring the matter to the National Transportation
Safety Board, as that agency then holds its own full trial-type hearing
before making a final determination.
14. Recommendation 69-6, Compilation of Statistics on Administrative Proceedings by Federal Departments and Agencies,203 recommends that agencies compile annual statistics tabulating the number
and pace of resolution of all "proceedings"-rulemaking and adjudication, formal and informal-that fix the rights, privileges, and obligations of private entities. The goal is to learn and publicize just how
many proceedings each agency began, had pending, and concluded in
198 Id. at 1.
199 ACUS Recommendation 69-2, Judicial Enforcement of Orders of the National Labor
Relations Board, 1 C.F.R. § 305.69-2 (1993).
200 RECOMMENDATION 69-3, supra note 36.
201 RECOMMENDATION 69-4, supra note 37.
202 RECOMMENDATION 69-5, supra note 53.
203 ACUS Recommendation 69-6, Compilation of Statistics on Administrative Proceedings
by Federal Departments and Agencies, 1 C.F.R. § 305.69-6 (1993}.
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each year, leading to and enabling efforts to reduce delays and
expense.
15. Recommendation 69-7, Consideration of Alternatives in Licensing Procedures. 204 Prompted by Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Commission 205 and similar decisions, this
recommendation urges each licensing agency to develop agency-specific procedures and guidelines for consideration of alternatives to the
applicant's proposed project.
16. Recommendation 69-8, Elimination of Certain Exemptions
from the APA Rulemaking Requirements. 206 This two-prong attack on
5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2), which exempts rulemakings regarding "public
property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts," 207 calls on Congress to
repeal the provision outright, and urges agencies voluntarily to provide notice and comment process for such rules even when not statutorily required except when there is good cause not to do so.
17. Recommendation 69-9, Recruitment and Selection of Hearing
Examiners; Continuing Training for Government Attorneys and Hearing Examiners; Creation of a Center for Continuing Legal Education in
Government. 208 This recommendation contains a variety of proposals
regarding hearing examiners, including expansion of the applicant
pool, elimination of the veterans' preference, a three-year trial program to test alternative selection measures, and expansion of continuing legal education for hearing examiners within each agency,
government-wide, and by private entities.
18. Recommendation 70-1, Parties Defendant. 209 This recommendation sought to eliminate dismissal of actions against agencies
where the plaintiff failed to identify properly the defendant; it called
on the Department of Justice to call such defects to the courts' attention so that the plaintiff could amend its pleadings and on Congress to
make statutory amendments to liberalize standards for naming government defendants and serving process.
204 ACUS Recommendation 69-7, Consideration of Alternatives in Licensing Procedures, 1
C.F.R. § 305.69-7 (1975).
205

Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965).

ACUS Recommendation 69-8, Elimination of Certain Exemptions from the APA
Rulemaking Requirements, 1 C.F.R. § 305.69-8 (1993).
206

201

Id. at 62.

ACUS Recommendation 69-9, Recruitment and Selection of Hearing Examiners; Continuing Training for Government Attorneys and Hearing Examiners; Creation of a Center for
Continuing Legal Education in Government, 1 C.F.R. § 305.69-9 (1988).
209 RECOMME NDAT ION 70-1, supra note 76.
208
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19. Recommendation 70-2, SEC No-Action Letters Under Section
4 of the Securities Act of 1933,210 sought to increase the transparency
and availability of the standards applied by the SEC in deciding
whether to issue a no-action letter informing parties in advance of a
transaction that SEC staff does not consider a violation of federal securities laws.
20. Recommendation 70-3, Summary Decision in Agency Adjudication.211 This is a model procedural rule providing for summary disposition in formal adjudications where there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact.
21. Recommendation 70-4, Discovery in Agency Adjudication. 212
By far the lengthiest early recommendation, this lays out a set of minimum procedural rules to govern discovery in formal adjudications.
22. Recommendation 70-5, Practices and Procedures Under the
Renegotiation Act of 1951,213 calls on the Renegotiation Board to
make public the criteria it uses in decisionmaking, provide more extensive and thorough written decisions, and make available upon request by a contractor all reports it has received regarding the
contractor's performance under existing contracts.

70-2, supra note 39.
ACUS Recommendation 70-3, Summary Decision in Agency Adjudication, 1 C.F.R.
§ 305.70-3 (1993).
212 ACUS Recommendation 70-4: Discovery in Agency Adjudication, 1 C.F.R. § 305.70-4
(1988).
213 RECOMMENDATION 70-5, supra note 41.
210

211

RECOMMENDATION
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B

Recommendations from ACUS's Second First Three Years214
1. Recommendation 2010-1, Agency Procedures for Considering

Preemption of State Law. 215 Reiterates a previous Conference recommendation that Congress clearly state its preemptive intent in the text
of the statutes it charges federal agencies with implementing. It recommends that agencies formulate appropriate internal procedures to
ensure consultation with representatives of state interests and to ensure that agencies evaluate the authority and basis asserted in support
of a preemptive rulemaking. It seeks to increase transparency regarding internal agency policies and recommends ways to improve external mechanisms for enforcing the applicable federal requirements.
2. Recommendation 2011-1, Legal Considerations in e-Rulemaking.216 Provides guidance on issues that have arisen in light of the
change from paper to electronic rulemaking procedures.
3. Recommendation 2011-2, Rulemaking Comments. 217 Recognizes innovations in the commenting process that could promote public participation and improve rulemaking outcomes. The
recommendation encourages agencies (1) to provide public guidance
on how to submit effective comments, (2) to leave comment periods
open for sufficient periods, generally at least sixty days for significant
regulatory actions and thirty days for other rulemakings, (3) to post
comments received online within a specified period after submission,
(4) to announce policies for anonymous and late-filed comments, and
(5) to consider when reply and supplemental comment periods are
useful.
4. Recommendation 2011-3, Compliance Standards for Government Contractor Employees-Personal Conflicts of Interest and Use of
Certain Non-Public Information. 218 Responds to agencies' need to
protect integrity and the public interest when they rely on contractors.
214 These summaries are ACUS's, available at its website, www.acus.gov, but have in some
instances been edited for length.
215 ACUS Recommendation 2010-1, Agency Procedures for Considering Preemption of
State Law, 76 Fed. Reg. 81 (Jan. 3, 2011).
216 ACUS Recommendation 2011-1, Legal Considerations in e-Rulemaking, 76 Fed. Reg.
48,789 (Aug. 9, 2011).
211 ACUS Recommendation 2011-2, Rulemaking Comments, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,791 (Aug. 9,
2011).
218 ACUS Recommendation 2011-3, Compliance Standards for Government Contractor
Employees-Personal Conflicts of Interest and Use of Certain Non-Public Information, 76 Fed.
Reg. 48,792 (Aug. 9, 2011).
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The Conference recommends that the Federal Acquisition Regulatory
Council provide model language for agency contracting officers to use
when negotiating or administering contracts that pose particular risks
that employees of contractors could have personal conflicts of interest
or could misuse non-public information.
5. Recommendation 2011-4, Agency Use of Video Hearings: Best
Practices and Possibilities for Expansion. 219 Encourages agencies to
consider the use of video teleconferencing technology for hearings
and other administrative proceedings, sets out relevant factors, and
identifies best practices for the implementation of this technology.
6. Recommendation 2011-5, Incorporation by Reference. 220 Addresses legal and policy issues related to agencies' incorporation by
reference in the Code of Federal Regulations of standards or other
materials that have been published elsewhere.
7. Recommendation 2011-6, International Regulatory Cooperation.221 Addresses how U.S. regulators can interact with foreign authorities to accomplish their domestic regulatory missions and
eliminate unnecessary non-tariff barriers to trade, proposing enhanced cooperation and information gathering, more efficient deployment of limited resources, and better information exchanges.
8. Recommendation 2011-7, The Federal Advisory Committee
Act-Issues and Proposed Reforms. 222 Includes proposals designed to
clarify the scope of F ACA and its implementing regulations, alleviate
certain procedural burdens associated with the existing regime, and
promote "best practices" aimed at enhancing the transparency and
objectivity of the advisory committee process.
9. Recommendation 2011-8, Agency Innovations in E-Rulemaking.223 Addresses how federal agency rulemaking can be improved by
better use of Internet-based technologies. The recommendation also
addresses the issue of improving e-rulemaking participation by those
who have historically faced barriers to access, including non-English
219 ACUS Recommendation 2011-4, Agency Use of Video Hearings: Best Practices and
Possibilities for Expansion, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,795 (Aug. 9, 2011).

220 ACUS Recommendation 2011-5, Incorporation by Reference, 77 Fed. Reg. 2257 (Jan.
17, 2012).
221 ACUS Recommendation 2011-6, International Regulatory Cooperation, 77 Fed. Reg.
2259 (Jan. 17, 2012).

222 ACUS Recommendation 2011-7, The Federal Advisory Committee Act-Issues and
Proposed Reforms, 77 Fed. Reg. 2261 (Jan. 17, 2012).
223 ACUS Recommendation 2011-8, Agency Innovations in E-Rulemaking, 77 Fed. Reg.
2264 (Jan. 17, 2012).
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speakers, users of low-bandwidth Internet connections, and individuals with disabilities.
10. Recommendation 2012-1, Regulatory Analysis Requirements.224 Considers the various regulatory analysis requirements imposed upon agencies by both executive orders and statutes. It offers
recommendations designed to ensure that agencies satisfy the existing
requirements in the most efficient and transparent manner possible. It
also provides recommendations on streamlining the existing analysis
requirements.
11. Recommendation 2012-2, Midnight Rules. 225 Addresses several issues raised by the publication of rules in the final months of a
presidential administration. The recommendation offers a number of
proposals for limiting the practice of issuing midnight rules by incumbent administrations and enhancing the powers of incoming administrations to review midnight rules.
12. Recommendation 2012-3, Immigration Removal Adjudication.226 Suggests a number of ways to enhance efficiency and fairness
in immigration removal cases.
13. Recommendation 2012-4, Paperwork Reduction Act. 227 Recommends ways to improve public engagement in the creation and review of information collection requests and to make the process more
efficient for the agencies and the Office of Management and Budget.
It also suggests ways to streamline the review and approval process
without increasing the burden on the public of agency information
collections.
14. Recommendation 2012-5, Improving Coordination of Related
Agency Responsibilities. 228 Addresses the problem of overlapping and
fragmented procedures associated with assigning multiple agencies
similar or related functions, or dividing authority among agencies.
The recommendation proposes some reforms aimed at improving coordination of agency policymaking, including joint rulemaking, interagency agreements, agency consultation provisions, and tracking and
evaluating the effectiveness of coordination initiatives.
224 ACUS Recommendation 2012-1 , Regulatory Analysis Requirements, 77 Fed. Reg.
47,801 (Aug. 10, 2012).
225 ACUS Recommendation 2012-2, Midnight Rules, 77 Fed. Reg. 47,802 (Aug. 10, 2012).
226 ACUS Recommendation 2012-3, Immigration Removal Adjudication, 77 Fed. Reg.
47,804 (Aug. 10, 2012).
227 ACUS Recommendation 2012-4, Paperwork Reduction Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 47,808 (Aug.
10, 2012).
22s ACUS Recommendation 2012-5, Improving Coordination of Related Agency Responsibilities, 77 Fed. Reg. 47,810 (Aug. 10, 2012).
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15. Recommendation 2012-6, Reform of 28 U.S.C. Section
1500.229 Urges Congress to repeal section 1500, which divests the U.S.
Court of Federal Claims of jurisdiction when a plaintiff has claims
against the government based on substantially the same operative
facts pending in another court, and replace it with a provision that
would create a presumption that in such circumstances later-filed actions would be stayed.
16. Recommendation 2012-7, Agency Use of Third-Party Programs to Assess Regulatory Compliance. 230 Sets forth guidance for
federal agencies that are establishing, or considering establishing, programs in which third parties assess whether regulated entities are in
compliance with regulatory standards and other requirements.
17. Recommendation 2012-8, Inflation Adjustment Act. 231 Addresses issues under the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment
Act, 232 urging Congress to change the current statutory framework to
address three provisions that result in penalty adjustments that may
not track the actual rate of inflation.
18. Recommendation 2013-1, Improving Consistency in Social
Security Disability Adjudications. 233 Identifies ways to improve the
adjudication of Social Security disability benefits claims before administrative law judges and the Appeals Council, suggests changes to the
evaluation of opinion evidence from medical professionals, and encourages the agency to enhance data capture and reporting.
19. Recommendation 2013-2, Benefit-Cost Analysis at Independent Regulatory Agencies. 234 Highlights a series of best practices directed at independent regulatory agencies in the preparation of
benefit-cost analyses that accompany proposed and final rules.
20. Recommendation 2013-3, Science in the Administrative Process.235 Promotes transparency in agencies' scientific decisionmaking,
229 ACUS Recommendation 2012-6, Reform of 28 U.S.C. Section 1500, 78 Fed. Reg. 2939
(Jan. 15, 2013).
230 ACUS Recommendation 2012-7, Agency Use of Third-Party Programs to Assess Regulatory Compliance, 78 Fed. Reg. 2941 (Jan. 15, 2013) .
231 ACUS Recommendation 2012-8, Inflation Adjustment Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 2943 (Jan. 15,
2013).
232 Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-410, 104 Stat.
890.
233 ACUS Recommendation 2013-1 , Improving Consistency in Social Security Disability
Adjudications, 78 Fed. Reg. 41 ,352 (July 10, 2013).
234 ACUS Recommendation 2013-2, Benefit-Cost Analysis at Independent Regulatory
Agencies, 78 Fed. Reg. 41,355 (July 10, 2013).
235 ACUS Recommendation 2013-3, Science in the Administrative Process, 78 Fed. Reg.
41 ,357 (July 10, 2013).
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including: articulation of questions to be informed by scientific information; attribution for agency personnel who contributed to scientific
analyses; public access to underlying data and literature; and conflictof-interest disclosures for privately funded research used by the agencies in licensing, rulemaking, or other administrative processes.
21. Recommendation 2013-4, The Administrative Record in Informal Rulemaking. 236 Offers best practices for agencies in the compilation, preservation, and certification of records in informal
rulemaking, and supports the judicial presumption of regularity for
agency administrative records except in certain limited circumstances.
22. Recommendation 2013-5, Social Media in Rulemaking. 237
Provides guidance to agencies on whether, how, and when social media might be used both lawfully and effectively to support rulemaking
activities.
23. Recommendation 2013-6, Remand Without Vacatur. 238 Examines the judicial remedy of remand without vacatur on review of
agency actions and equitable factors that may justify its application.
The recommendation offers guidance for courts that remand agency
actions and for agencies responding to judicial remands.
24. Recommendation 2013-7, GPRA Modernization Act of 2010:
Examining Constraints To, and Providing Tools For, Cross-Agency
Collaboration.239 Examines perceived and real constraints to crossagency collaboration under the Government Performance and Results
Act (GPRA) Modernization Act240 and highlights tools available to
help agencies collaborate. It offers guidance to help increase transparency, improve information sharing, and facilitate better agency reporting under the Act. The recommendation is also aimed at
enhancing the role of agency attorneys and other agency staff in facilitating cross-agency collaboration.
25. Statement # 18 (2013), Improving the Timeliness of OIRA
Regulatory Review. 241 Without making an actual recommendation,
236 ACUS Recommendation 2013-4, The Administrative Record in Informal Rulemaking,
78 Fed. Reg. 41,358 (July 10, 2013).
237 ACUS Recommendation 2013-5, Social Media in Rulemaking, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,269
(Dec. 17, 2013).
238 ACUS Recommendation 2013-6, Remand Without Vacatur, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,272 (Dec.
17, 2013).
239 ACUS Recommendation 2013-7, GPRA Modernization Act of 2010: Examining Constraints to, and Providing Tools for, Cross-Agency Collaboration, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,273 (Dec. 17,
2013).
240 Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) Modernization Act, 5 U.S.C. § 306;
31 u.s.c. §§ 1115-16, 1120-25 (2012).
241 ACUS Statement# 18, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,275 (Dec. 17, 2013).
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this statement highlights potential mechanisms for improving review
times of rules under review by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs ("OIRA"), including promoting enhanced coordination
between OIRA and agencies prior to the submission of rules, encouraging increased transparency concerning the reasons for delayed reviews, and ensuring that OIRA has adequate staffing to complete
reviews in a timely manner.

